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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KELLY RAY DEBOARD, : Case No. 980387-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JTJRISPICTIQNAIi STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998) , in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, judge, presiding. Jurisdiction 
is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (judgment and conviction) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Is Deboard!s sentence invalid where the trial court 
sentenced him to 365 days in jail outside the presence of 
appointed counsel and without apprising him of his right to the 
presence of counsel? 
Standard Q£ Review: n[T]he determination that a defendant 
has intelligently waived his right to counsel !turns !upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, 
including the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused,'1 the constitutionality of an accused1s waiver of the 
right to counsel is a mixed question involving both fact and 
law." State V. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 780 (Utah App. 1996) 
(quotations omitted) (citing State v. Tenn^y. 913 P.2d 750, 753 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Penar 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Kelly Ray Deboard's ("Deboard") issue is preserved 
on the record for appeal (!,R.ff) at 61[3-7]. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provisions are 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Rights of Accused, United States Const. Amend. VI (1991): 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Rights of Accused Persons, Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (Supp. 1998) : 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. 
Rights of Defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1995) : 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: (a) 
To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Kelly Ray Deboard ("Deboard") was charged by 
information with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998) and an arrest warrant 
was issued. R.3-5. Deboard was appointed counsel from the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA"). R.10. On December 23, 
1997, he entered a guilty plea to attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) . R.39. 
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Prior to sentencing, Deboard was appointed substitute 
counsel from LDA when his original attorney left that office. 
R.32. The new attorney entered her appearance with the court on 
March 20, 1998. Id. 
Meanwhile, Deboard was referred to ("AP&P") on December 23, 
1997, to prepare a sentencing report. R.15. A sentencing 
hearing was also set for February 25, 1998. R.18. As of 
February 16, 1998, Deboard had not reported to AP&P. R.15. He 
also missed the February 25th hearing. R.19,20. An arrest 
warrant was issued on March 2, 1998. R.20. However, the warrant 
was recalled on March 12, 1998, since Deboard missed the hearing 
on account of a snow storm and impassable roads. R.28,61[4]. 
A second sentencing hearing was set for April 3, 1998. 
R.29. Deboard still had not reported to AP&P as of March 25th. 
R.30. He also failed to appear for the sentencing hearing and 
later explained that he did not receive notice of the new date. 
R.61[4] . No warrant was issued upon Deboard1s failure to appear 
at the April 3rd hearing. R.61[4-5]. 
The sentencing date was reset for May 13, 1998. R.33. 
Deboard appeared for sentencing this time, but had not met with 
AP&P beforehand. R.34,36. Deboard was not accompanied by his 
attorney and, in fact, did not know the attorney1s name on 
account of the earlier change in counsel. R.61[3]. 
Even though Deboard was not accompanied by his attorney, the 
judge did not inform Deboard of his right to the presence of his 
attorney at sentencing, nor did he ascertain whether Deboard 
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voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the right before 
proceeding with the hearing. R.61[3-7]. Instead, the judge 
immediately asked Deboard why he did not report to AP&P. R.61[3-
6]. Deboard explained that he had an attorney, although he did 
not know her name. R.61[3]. He also explained that he had been 
in contact with "law enforcement" in an effort to "get these 
matters resolved." R.61[6]. 
Rather than granting a third continuance in order that 
Deboard may locate his attorney and meet with AP&P to finish the 
report, the judge sentenced Deboard to 365 days in jail. 
R.39,61[6]. Deboard requested "private counsel" upon the judge!s 
sentence. R.61[6]. Rather than honoring Deboard!s request, the 
judge reiterated the sentence and set a review date for June 19, 
1998. R.61[7]. On June 19, Deboard and his attorney appeared 
for the review, at which time the court suspended the remaining 
300 days in jail and placed Deboard on probation for three years. 
R.52-53,55. Deboard appeals from the sentence. R.56. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEBOARD BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
TNVAT.TD WHERE THE COURT IMPOSED THE SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AND WITHOUT ESTABLISHING VALID 
WAIVER.. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in sentencing 
Deboard where it failed to conduct a searching colloquy that 
established that Deboard was aware of his right to the presence 
of his attorney or that he waived such right knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. Moreover, the circumstances of 
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the case do not evince Deboard's appreciation of his right or 
valid waiver thereof. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that a 
criminal defendant has the right to the presence and effective 
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding where substantial rights may be affected, including 
sentencing. £££ Mempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128, 137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 
19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (right to counsel under Sixth Amendment 
"extends to sentencing" since substantial rights of accused are 
at stake) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 
92 L.Ed. 1690) (1948)); Kuehnert v. Turner. 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 
(Utah 1972) (Article I Section 12 of Utah Constitution guarantees 
right to presence of counsel at sentencing unless defendant 
executes a valid waiver) (citations omitted) (see Addendum B -
copy of opinion); State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah App. 
1996) (sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceeding 
necessitating right to counsel); State v. Casarez
 r 656 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (Utah 1982) (same); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) 
(1995) ("[i]n criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled 
[t]o . . . defend in person or by counsel"). 
A defendantf s right to the presence of counsel at sentencing 
exists on account of the particular impact that sentencing has on 
a defendants liberty. As noted by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, a defendant's "ultimate fate is [often] determined more 
by [sentencing] than the determination of guilt or innocence." 
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United States v. Salerno. 61 F.3d 214, 220-22 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Hence, the presence of counsel at sentencing is "one of the most 
fundamental and cherished rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 
Id. Moreover, it is "necessary to insure fundamental human 
rights of life and liberty." Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58 
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
Some of the pitfalls faced by a defendant at sentencing 
necessitating the aid of counsel include complex guidelines 
wherein the judge may consider any relevant information and not 
just the "conduct that constitutes the offense of conviction. . . 
. In addition, a defendant who is unfamiliar with the post 
conviction process may inadvertently waive a meritorious argument 
that he/she might otherwise have raised on appeal." Id.; see 
also Salerno. 61 F.3d at 220 ("sentencing is a critical and often 
times complicated part of the criminal process that contains 
subtleties which may be beyond the appreciation of the average 
layperson"). Hence, the aid of counsel is necessary 
so that [a defendant has] a real opportunity to present to 
the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendants conduct, as well as to 
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's 
past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its 
administration and enforcement of penal laws. 
Kiehnert, 499 p.2d at 840-41. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, a sentence is 
sustainable on appeal only if the trial court conducts a colloquy 
on the record establishing that an unrepresented defendant 
understands his right to the presence of counsel, and that he 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his right before 
6 
proceeding with sentencing. &££ Edwards V. Arizona/ 451 U.S. 
477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege"). Alternatively, a sentence is valid if the 
totality of the circumstances reflected in the record evince the 
defendant's knowledge of his right to counsel, as well as his 
voluntary and intelligent waiver thereof. Id. (waiver may be 
inferred from totality of circumstances). Deboard's sentence is 
invalid because neither a colloquy conducted by the court nor 
other circumstances in the record establish that he understood 
his right and voluntarily waived it before the judge imposed 
sentence. 
In a case factually similar to the case at bar, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Kuehnert invalidated a sentence under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution because the sentencing judge 
failed to inform the defendant of his right to an attorney, and 
circumstances of the case did not otherwise establish a valid 
waiver. 499 P.2d at 841-42. The Court reasoned that the 
appellant, a habeas corpus petitioner, was not accompanied by his 
attorney at his sentencing hearing. Id. at 841. Moreover, the 
record showed that Kuehnert was represented by an attorney when 
he entered his guilty plea and that "there was no entry of 
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing." Id. at 839. In 
addition, "[a]t the time of sentencing the trial court neither 
advised [Kuehnert] of his right to counsel nor made inquiry as to 
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why counsel was not present." Id. Rather, "the court merely 
queried whether it was [Kuehnert's] desire not to wait but to be 
sentenced immediately, to which [Kuehnert] responded 
affirmatively." Id. at 840. The court then sentenced Kuehnert. 
Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
sentence and remanded for a new hearing since the court neither 
informed Kuehnert of his right to the presence of counsel nor 
established waiver of such right. Id. at 840-41. The Supreme 
Court also noted that "since [Kuehnert] was not informed of his 
right to the presence of counsel, there is no ground upon which 
to predicate a waiver of this right." Id. at 840 (citing In re 
Haror 458 P.2d 500, 506 (Ca. 1969) ("we cannot condone . . . the 
failure of the trial court to reinform defendant of his right to 
counsel when he appeared for the first time without his counsel 
for sentencing, nor can we countenance the trial court's failure 
to require defendant's waiver of his right to counsel in open 
court before the rendition of sentence"). 
In light of Kuehnert and the other foregoing authority, 
Deboard's sentence is invalid because neither a colloquy nor 
other circumstances evident from the record establish that 
Deboard understood his right to the presence of an attorney, nor 
intelligently, knowingly or voluntarily waived such right before 
the court proceeded with the hearing. 
First, like Kuehnert. the record is devoid of any meaningful 
or timely communication from the court regarding Deboard's right 
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to his attorney's assistance at the hearing, let alone a colloquy 
establishing a valid waiver. See 499 P.2d at 840-41. In 
informing a defendant of his right to counsel and establishing 
intelligent and voluntary waiver, a court is not required to 
carry on a "rote dialogue." Salerno, 61 F.3d at 220. Recognizing 
that "sentencing hearings demand much less specialized knowledge 
than trials," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "the 
inquiry at sentencing need only be tailored to that proceeding . 
. . [and] need not be as exhaustive and searching as a similar 
inquiry [at] trial." Id. at 219. 
"Nevertheless, sentencing is a critical and often times 
complicated part of the criminal process that contains subtleties 
which may be beyond the appreciation of the average layperson," 
wherein an unrepresented defendant may "inadvertently waive a 
meritorious argument," and which often times has more impact on a 
defendant's "ultimate fate" than the "determination of guilt" 
itself. Id. at 220; see supra 5-6 (discussing complexities of 
sentencing necessitating assistance of counsel). "Given these 
intricacies, it is particularly important that a sentencing court 
be certain that a defendant understands the perilous path he/she 
is going down [during] sentencing without benefit of counsel." 
Salernor 61 F.3d at 220. 
Accordingly, "at a minimum, a trial judge must make 'a 
searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/her] that the 
defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary, . . . [and] 
calculated to insure that the defendant is 'made aware of the 
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dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he[/she] knows what he[/she] is doing 
and [the] choice is made with eyes wide open.'1"1 Id. (quoting 
Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. 
McCann. 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed.2d 268) (1942)). 
Moreover, a sentencing court must "indulge in every reasonable 
presumption against waiver." Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387, 
404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). 
The following exchange demonstrates how the court proceeded 
to confront the unaccompanied Deboard regarding the substance of 
the issue underlying the court's decision to jail him, i.e. his 
delay in completing a presentence report, and then sentence 
Deboard to jail before the judge mentioned his attorney for the 
first time. 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 
187 (Utah 1987), noted with regard to the defendant's right to 
counsel at trial that it is the court's duty to ensure that a 
defendant waives his right knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily. To this end, the Frampton Court expressed a 
preference for a "colloquy on the record, " as opposed to an ad hoc 
discourse. Id. at 187-88. Absent a colloquy, there is a greater 
risk that a defendant's challenge based on the right to counsel 
will succeed on appeal if, under the totality of the circumstances, 
the record does not strongly evince the defendant's "actual 
awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se." Id. at 188. 
Generally, [a valid waiver] can only be elicited after 
penetrating questioning by the trial court. Therefore, a 
colloquy on the record between the court and the accused is 
the preferred method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver 
because it insures that defendants understand the risks of 
self-representation. Moreover, it is the most efficient means 
by which appeals may be limited. 
IdL at 187. 
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(R.61E3]) 
Court: Mr. Deboard, we were to impose sentence here today 
and Ifve received a note that you have not gone over for a 
presentence report. 
Defendant: I was -- went down and got the papers last time 
I left court, they said to call the number that was on the 
presentence report or I could just mail it in. It's 
supposed to be handled by Wade Smith. And I don't know who 
my attorney is because my other one I guess she had her last 
day right before my last court date, they told me that day 
that it was Debbie or something. 
Court: I think this is about the second time we've 
continued your sentencing; is that right? 
Deboard: This is correct. 
(R.61[41) 
Court: Let's see, so you entered a plea [on December 23] . 
. . and failed to appear on the 25th of February [to 
complete the sentencing report.] 
Deboard: Yeah, that's when we got snowed up in the canyon. 
And I had called the courts and was supposed to come in and 
get a court date and I thought they were going to mail me a 
court date. 
Court: And we set the sentencing over to . . . the 3rd of 
April and you didn't report for the presentence report? 
Deboard: I had no idea that I was supposed to. 
Court: So this would be our third (R.61[5]) continuance [if 
we granted your request] today? 
Deboard: It would. 
Court: I'm hesitant to do that. What I'm going to do is 
set another sentencing date but order that you be held in 
the county jail until I impose sentence. AP&P will come and 
visit you in the county jail. 
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Deboard: I -- is there a -- can I get private counsel? 
Court: You can hire your own lawyer if you like. . . . But 
we have a legal defender who will represent you in the case 
. . . who has already contacted the clerk of the court. 
Deboard: Could I speak with you about these in private? 
Court: I can't speak with you in private. If you want to 
speak here on the record here in court. 
(R.61[6]) 
Deboard: I've been working with law enforcement in some 
cases, they are supposed to have contacted you guys. I've 
been trying to get these matters resolved for a long time 
now and they have -- you know, I don't know what's going on 
with--
Court: Well, all I know is I haven't been contacted 
recently by law enforcement. 
Deboard: You can talk to Detective Odor. 
Court: But nonetheless, . . . this is the third time around 
for us. I just don't think we can do that anymore. We need 
to get this case resolved. . . . [Y]ou haven't gone over for 
the presentence reports. I've ordered you to do things that 
you have not done and we're in a situation here where I've 
got to impose sentence and I have incomplete information 
here. 
Deboard: I've really been trying to do-
Court: It's not that tough. All you have to do is go over 
to the presentence office . . . and then (R.61[7]) they'll 
tell you a time to come back and sit down and talk with 
them. 
Deboard: The told me that I could mail my presentence 
report to them. I've talked to Mr. Witchman over at AP&P, 
he's been involved with Odor and myself and several others. 
I've been really trying to get this thing resolved. 
Court: Well, I'm ordering you serve a term of 365 days in 
jail. I will review the decision which I have made on the 
19th of June. . . . Thank you. [Hearing concluded]. 
R.61[3-7] (emphasis added). 
The foregoing exchange does not amount to the sort of 
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searching inquiry, "calculated to insure" that Deboard1s waiver 
was "understanding and voluntary," contemplated by Salerno and 
similar cases. Salerno, 61 F.3d at 220. For instance, the court 
never formally informed the unaccompanied Deboard of his right to 
the presence of counsel in the first place. In fact, the judge 
only mentioned Deboard's attorney after he imposed sentence and 
upon Deboard1s contemporaneous request for "private counsel." 
R.61[5] . As stated in Kuehnert. where a defendant is "not 
informed of his right to the presence of counsel, there is no 
ground upon which to predicate a waiver of that right." 499 P.2d 
at 840. The same is true for the instant case -- where Deboard 
was not informed of his right to the presence of counsel in the 
first place, a valid waiver cannot be established. Id. 
Consequently, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
proceeding with the hearing and the sentence imposed is invalid. 
The trial court's error in failing to inform Deboard of his 
right to the presence of counsel in the first place is 
underscored given several warning signals that the court had 
indicating the need to re-inform Deboard of his right in this 
case. First, the very fact that Deboard appeared alone should 
have alerted the trial court to the necessity of informing 
Deboard of his right. As noted by Justice Black of the United 
States Supreme Court, a judge must exercise heightened 
sensitivity for a defendants rights when that defendant stands 
alone before the court. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 
13 
722, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) ("[i]t is the solemn duty 
of a [] judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to 
make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure 
the fullest protection of [the right to counsel]11). 
Additionally, the court should have been alerted to its duty 
given that the court knew Deboard had appointed counsel at the 
time of the hearing. Not only did the trial court acknowledge 
that Deboard had a "legal defender" after it imposed sentence, 
R.61[5], but Deboard himself noted at the beginning of the 
hearing that he had an attorney although he did not know her 
name. R.61[3]. Moreover, the court knew that Deboard was 
represented by an attorney when he entered his guilty plea and 
had at no time prior to sentencing moved to withdraw counsel from 
his case. See Kuenhert. 499 P.2d at 839 (invalidating sentence 
base in part on fact that sentencing court failed to inform 
defendant of his right to the presence of counsel even though 
judge knew defendant was represented when he entered guilty plea 
and defendant did not subsequently move to withdraw counsel prior 
to sentencing). Finally, Deboard's new attorney had properly 
entered her appearance as substitute counsel on March 23, 1998, 
almost two months before the sentencing hearing. R.32. In sum, 
the court's error in imposing sentence is underscored by 
foregoing, obvious warning signals highlighting the need to 
inform Deboard of his right to the presence of counsel at the 
hearing. 
Even assuming that the sentencing court had at least 
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informed Deboard of his right to the presence of his attorney, 
the sentence would still fail because the exchange between the 
judge and Deboard is lacking in any conversation regarding 
Deboardrs understanding of his right or indications that he 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived it. Id. at 841. 
As evidenced by the sentencing hearing transcript, the judge 
began to question Deboard about his delay in completing the 
sentencing report before he mentioned Deboardfs attorney for the 
first time. R.61[3-5]. Just after the judge indicated that he 
would incarcerate Deboard, Deboard, of his own volition, 
requested "private counsel." R.61[5]. At that time, the court 
only mentioned that Deboard had a "legal defender who would 
represent you in the case." Id. The judge did not clarify on 
the record with Deboard that he had a right to his attorney in 
this hearing in particular. He likewise failed to ascertain 
whether Deboard understood the risks involved in proceeding 
without his attorney, and based on that understanding whether he 
voluntarily agreed to proceed without her. Where the record 
lacks any clarifying colloquy between Deboard and the court, the 
judge failed to establish a constitutionally valid waiver, 
rendering Deboard's sentence invalid under Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution, Kuehnert
 r 499 P.2d at 841, and the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Salerno, 
61 F.3d at 221 (invalidating sentence under Sixth Amendment where 
sentencing judge failed to establish waiver on record). 
In addition to the absence of a clear colloquy, the trial 
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court erred as a matter of law in imposing sentence where the 
overall circumstances likewise fail to establish that Deboard 
understood his right to the presence of counsel or that he 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived such right. 
First, the record establishes that Deboard actually requested his 
attorney and never waived such right. As noted above, Deboard 
mentioned his attorney at the beginning of the hearing. R.61[3]. 
While Deboard's mention of his attorney was not an unequivocal 
request for her presence, under the circumstances, the judge 
should have been alerted to the fact that Deboard might want her 
assistance at the hearing and accordingly inform him of his 
right. In any event, Deboard unequivocally requested an attorney 
after the judge stated he would incarcerate Deboard. R.61[5]. 
At that time the judge definitely should have known to establish 
Deboard's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver before 
sentencing him to jail. 
In addition to Deboard's request for an attorney, Deboard 
expressed genuine alarm and was hesitant to carry on with the 
hearing without his attorney once the judge stated that he would 
place him in jail. Id. For example, Deboard seemed to lose his 
train of thought and began to stutter once the judge indicated 
that he would incarcerate him. IdL; see Salerno. 61 F.3d at 221 
(invalidating sentence of unrepresented defendant in part because 
defendant expressed reluctance in proceeding; "defendant's 
apparent reluctance to proceed without counsel should have 
alerted the court to the need to inform [him of his right and to 
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establish waiver]"). These facts alone bear against any finding 
the court may have made that Deboard waived his right to the 
presence of an attorney and voluntarily proceeded without her. 
The trial court's error is compounded, however, given that 
Deboard did not exhibit any sort of courtroom experience or 
education on the record that might lead the court to believe that 
he understood his right to counsel and yet proceeded voluntarily. 
See, e.g.. United States v. Verkulien. 690 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 
1982) (waiver, although not explicit, established where defendant 
was a law student, expressed understanding of his right to 
counsel at sentencing, and appeared willing to proceed 
unrepresented); State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 783-84 (Utah 
App. 1996) (valid waiver of counsel at trial established where 
judge ascertained on the record that defendant understood 
charges, penalties, technicalities and rules of trial and had 
previously represented himself). If anything, Deboard seemed 
somewhat confused, albeit in earnest, about the procedure 
involved in completing the sentencing report. For example, 
Deboard was confused about his new attorney's name. R.61[3]. He 
explained that he was in touch with "law enforcement . . . trying 
to get these matters resolved for sometime." R.61[6]. He even 
gave the names of particular officers who he assumed would be in 
contact with the court. R.61[3,7]. In fact, according to the 
judge, Deboard was supposed to report directly to AP&P to 
complete the necessary report. R.61[5-7]. Where Deboard 
demonstrated a lack of courtroom experience and misunderstood the 
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procedure involved in completing the report, the trial court 
erred in proceeding with the sentencing hearing. Cf. McDonald, 
922 P.2d at 783-84 (valid waiver where defendant exhibited 
understanding of charges and trial procedure).2 
The fact that Deboard's delay in completing the report was 
the impetus for sentencing him to jail further underscores the 
court's error in this case. Given Deboard's confused approach 
toward completing the necessary report, the court should have 
been all the more sensitive to the need to ensure that Deboard 
understood his right to the assistance of counsel during the 
confrontation between Deboard and the judge. As evidenced by the 
record, the sum of the judge's discourse, and the reasoning 
behind the jail sentence, concerned Deboard's delay in completing 
the report. Without the benefit of counsel, Deboard did not have 
"a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation 
2
 Even if the judge subjectively felt that Deboard understood 
his right to the presence of counsel, appreciated the 
technicalities of the hearing, and voluntarily and intelligently 
waived such right, the sentence is nonetheless invalid since the 
judge did not establish his subjective beliefs on the record. As 
noted by the Salerno Court, "[w]e appreciate that the sentencing 
judge (who also conducted Salerno's trial) may have felt that he had 
sufficient familiarity with this defendant to accept a waiver of 
counsel for purposes of sentencing without a searching inquiry into 
Salerno's familiarity with, or appreciation of, the complexities of 
sentencing. . . . However, we cannot infer a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel based upon the district court's subjective overall 
impression We have previously stated 'that a colloquy . . . 
is the preferred method of ascertaining that a waiver is knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent.' . . . We reiterate that 'it is 
appropriate for this searching inquiry to appear on the record' so 
as to allow a reviewing court to examine the district court's 
determination in the event of an appeal. . . . [FJailure to do this 
requires a remand for resentencing." 61 F.3d at 221 (quotations 
omitted). 
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of . . . or in explanation of the [his] conduct, as well as to 
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past 
record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its 
administration and enforcement of penal laws." Kuehnertr 499 
P.2d at 840-41. 
As noted by the Salerno Court, a sentencing court need not 
allow itself to be "manipulated into granting a continuance." 61 
F.3d at 221. Nonetheless, it is still obliged to insure that the 
defendant is informed of his right to the presence of counsel and 
executes a valid waiver before proceeding. Id. Indeed, the 
court in this case could have avoided any perceived manipulation 
by Deboard by simply calling Legal Defender's office. In doing 
so, the court could have kept Deboard in its presence and at the 
same time locate Deboard's attorney.3 In the end, Deboard's 
right to the presence of counsel would have been honored. 
As a final matter, the trial court's error in this case, 
i.e. the denial of Deboard's constitutional right to the presence 
of counsel, amounts to "constitutional error" and is therefore 
presumptively prejudicial, requiring remand. The United States 
Supreme Court has uniformly found constitutional error without 
any showing of prejudice when, as in the instant case, counsel 
was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the 
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding. See, e.g.r 
fleriers v. United States. 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 
3
 Although not reflected in the record, trial counsel 
indicated that she was in the courthouse while Deboard's sentencing 
hearing was underway. 
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592 (1976); Herring v. New York. 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 
L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-613, 
92 S.Ct. 1891, 1895, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972); Hamilton v. Alabama. 
368 U.S. 52, 55, 82 S.Ct. 157, 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); White 
v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 1051, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 
(1963) (per curiam); Ferguson v. Georgia. 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 
756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961); Williams v. Kaiser. 323 U.S. 471, 
475-476, 65 S.Ct. 363, 366, 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945). The complete 
denial of the assistance of counsel is constitutional error 
because "impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy 
to identify and, for that reason and because the [government] is 
directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent." 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 u.s. 668, 692, 104 s.ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (citing United States v. Tronic. 466 U.S. 648, 
664 and n.25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). 
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals likewise 
found presumptive constitutional error, and remanded for 
resentencing, in a factually similar case where the defendant was 
sentenced without benefit of counsel. See flolden v. Newsome. 755 
F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (11th Cir. 1985). Based on the principals of 
an adversarial system, wherein "partisan advocacy on both sides 
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective [of justice]," 
and in light of the particular complexities inherent in 
sentencing, the Golden Court held the defendant's sentence to be 
"constitutionally infirm" on account of the wholesale denial of 
his right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 484. "The Sixth 
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Amendment recognizes the right to counsel because effective 
counsel plays a role that is critical to the ability of the 
adversarial system to produce just results. In this case, the 
justice of Mr. Golden1s sentence has been rendered unreliable by 
a total breakdown in the adversary process at the sentencing 
stage of his trial. Having failed to pass through the crucible 
of meaningful adversarial testing, the sentence must be vacated." 
For the reasoning set forth above, Deboard's sentence is 
likewise rendered "constitutionally infirm" on account of the 
trial court's actions, which served to deny Deboard his right to 
the presence of counsel at his sentencing. Without counsel, he 
too was denied a meaningful opportunity his case for a more 
lenient sentence. "Having failed to pass through the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing," Deboard's sentence is 
presumptively invalid and the matter should be remanded. Id. 
In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
proceeding with the sentencing hearing where Deboard was 
unrepresented by counsel. The court failed to conduct a colloquy 
on the record which would establish Deboard's understanding of 
his right to the presence of counsel and that he voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived such right. Moreover, the 
circumstances of the case as reflected in the record do not 
establish that Deboard understood or validly waived his right. 
Accordingly, Deboard's sentence is invalid under the Sixth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12 
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of the Utah Constitution. Finally, the trial court's error, 
which served to deny Deboard of his right to the presence of 
counsel altogether, amounts to presumptively prejudicial 
constitutional error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Deboard respectfully requests this 
Court to vacate and remand the sentence. 
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*839 499 P.2d 839 
28 Utah 2d 150 
Max KUEHNERT, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 12656. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 18, 1972. 
Prisoner petitioner for writ of habeas corpus. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., entered order denying petition and the 
petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, 
C.J., held that where defendant was represented by 
counsel at time his plea of guilty was entered and 
there was no entry as to withdrawal of counsel prior 
to sentencing at which defendant appeared without 
counsel and without receiving advice as to his right 
to counsel, absence of counsel rendered sentence 
invalid and cause would be remanded with directions 
to proceed to fix date for pronuncing sentence in 
proper manner. 
Remanded with directions. 
Ellett, J., concurred in the result and filed an 
opinion. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW <®==>988 
110 — 
110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final 
Commitment 
110k985 Formalities in Pronouncing Sentence 
110k988 Presence of counsel. 
Utah 1972. 
Since habeas corpus petitioner was not informed of 
his right to the presence of counsel at time of 
sentencing, there was no ground upon which to 
predicate a waiver of this right by him. Const, art. 
1, Sees. 12, 13. 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <®^988 
110 — 
110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final 
Commitment 
110k985 Formalities in Pronouncing Sentence 
110k988 Presence of counsel. 
Utah 1972. 
It is necessary to have counsel present at time of 
hearing so that there is a real opportunity to present 
to court facts in extenuation of offense or in 
explanation of defendant's conduct, to correct any 
errors or mistakes in reports of defendant's past 
record and to appeal to equity of court in its 
administration and enforcement of penal laws. 
Const, art. 1, Sees. 12, 13; U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <®=>980(1) 
110 —-
110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final 
Commitment 
110k980 Sentence on Pleas of Guilty or Nolo 
Contendere 
110k980(l) In general. 
Formerly HOkl 181 
[See headnote text below] 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <©^ 1181.5(8) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(U) Determination and Disposition of 
Cause 
HOkl 181.5 Remand in General; Vacation 
HOkl 181.5(3) Remand for Determination or 
Reconsideration of Particular Matters 
HOkl 181.5(8) Sentence. 
Utah 1972. 
Where defendant was represented by counsel at 
time his plea of guilty was entered and there was no 
entry as to withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing 
at which defendant appeared without counsel and 
without receiving advice as to his right to counsel, 
absence of counsel rendered sentence invalid and 
cause would be remanded with directions to proceed 
to fix date for pronouncing sentence in proper 
manner. Const, art. 1, Sees. 12, 13; U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-17. 
[28 UTAH2D 150] Margret S. Taylor, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David S. Young, 
David R. Irvine, Asst. Attys. Gen., [28 UTAH2D 
151] Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court 
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denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The trial court determined that plaintiff was 
lawfully incarcerated in the Utah State Prison 
pursuant to a conviction of the crime of forgery 
based upon a guilty plea, knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered, and that plaintiff's rights 
were not violated by lack of counsel at the 
sentencing proceeding. 
On appeal plaintiff asserts that his sentence was 
invalid and void on the ground that he was without 
counsel at a critical stage of the criminal 
proceedings, namely, at the time of sentencing. 
A review of the record reveals that plaintiff was 
represented by counsel at the time his plea of guilty 
was entered; furthermore, there was no entry of 
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing. At the 
time of sentencing the trial court neither advised 
plaintiff of his right to counsel nor made inquiry as 
to why counsel was not present. In the colloquy 
between the court and plaintiff, the court merely 
queried *840 whether it was plaintiff's desire not 
to wait but to be sentenced immediately, to which 
plaintiff responded affirmatively and expressed 
appreciation for prompt attention, as his stay in the 
jail was 'dead time.' 
[1] During the evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's 
petition, the court queried whether the State desired 
to show a waiver by plaintiff of counsel at the 
sentencing The State responded negatively. The 
State was of the opinion that lack of counsel at the 
sentencing constituted harmless error. The issue of 
waiver was, therefore, not presented to the trial 
court. However, it should be observed that since 
plaintiff was not informed of his right to the 
presence of counsel, there is no ground upon which 
ot predicate a waiver of this right. (FN1) 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, 
provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, . . . . 
In the case of In re Boyce, (FN2) the court held 
that under Article I, Section 13, of [28 UTAH2D 
152] the Constitution of California, which is 
substantially similar to Article I, Section 12, of the 
Constitution of Utah, a defendant was entitled to 
counsel when judgment was pronounced and 
sentence imposed. The court held the judgment 
must be set aside and the matter remanded for 
resentencing with counsel present, where it appeared 
that defendant had been represented by counsel at all 
prior stages of the proceedings but was without 
counsel at the time the judgment and sentence were 
pronounced. This ruling was considered particularly 
applicable where there was nothing in the record to 
indicate that defendant was informed of his right to 
counsel or that he knew that he was entitled to the 
aid of an attorney. (FN3) 
In Lee v. State, (FN4) the court stated that while 
there was a sharp conflict in authorities as to 
whether the presence of counsel for an accsed was 
necessary at the time of sentence, they thought the 
better rule was that when counsel had not been 
waived, the absence thereof invalidated the sentence. 
The court observed that if there were any time that a 
defendant on a criminal charge might be in need of 
an attorney to speak in his behalf or to advise him of 
his legal rights it could well be at the time of 
sentencing. 
In this jurisdiction, Section 77-35-17, 
U.C.A.1953, grants the trial judge power to place 
the defendant on probation. 
. . . The granting or withholding of probation 
involves considering intangibles of character, 
personality and attitude, of which the cold record 
gives little inkling. These matters, which are to be 
considered in connection with the prior record of 
the accused, are of such nature that the problem of 
probation must of necessity rest within the 
discretion of the judge who hears the case. . . . 
(FN5) 
[2] The foregoing indicates the necessity of the 
presence of counsel at the time of sentencing; so that 
there is a real opportunity to present to the court 
facts in extenuation of the offense or in explanation 
of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any 
errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past 
record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its 
administration *841 and enforcement of penal 
laws. (FN6) 
The conflict in the authorities to which the court 
made reference in Lee v. State (FN7) has been 
resolved by the United States Supreme[28 UTAH2D 
153] Court. In McConnell v. Rhay, (FN8) the 
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court stated: 
As we said in Mempa (v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336), 'the necessity for the 
aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing 
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in 
general aiding and assisting the defendant to 
present his case as to sentence is apparent.' 389 
U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 257, 19 L.Ed.2d at 341. 
The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, 
be treated like the right to counsel at other stages 
of adjudication. 
[3] In the instant action, since the record does not 
indicate that plaintiff knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel at the time of sentencing, 
we are compelled to hold his sentence invalid. 
However, this does not mean that the plaintiff is 
entitled to an absolute discharge. 
The defect in the first sentence did not inhere in 
the judgment of conviction. The defendant 
pleaded guilty, and made no attack on any of the 
proceedings except the sentence. Had he appealed 
from the illegal sentence, as he had a right to do, 
notwithstanding his plea of guilty, this court would 
have set aside the sentence as void and have 
remanded the case to the trial court for a valid 
sentence. (Citation) There is no principle on 
which it can be successfully maintained that, by 
serving part of a void sentence instead of appealing 
from it, but later attacking it in collateral 
proceedings, the defendant can obtain immunity 
from being sentenced to the judgment provided by 
law. (Citation) (FN9) 
This cause is remanded to the district court with 
directions to proceed to fix a date for pronouncing 
sentence upon plaintiff in a manner consistent with 
the views herein expressed. 
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., 
concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result, not because there was any 
error below, but simply to avoid having the matter 
taken before the federal courts, where the defendant 
would be released. There is no federal question 
involved in this matter. (FN1) 
Even if the provisions of the Sixth Amendment 
were applicable to this case, it [28 UTAH2D 154] 
should not require a release of the defendant on a 
habeas corpus proceeding. So far as pertinent to 
this matter, that Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
At the time of the adoption of this Amendment 
there was no right to counsel in the courts of 
England in felony cases. In fact, it was not until 
1826, 50 years after the Amendment, that a 
defendant charged with felony in the courts of 
England could be represented by counsel at trial. 
It was a determination by the people of the 13 
colonies to see that the new federal entity did not 
follow the rule of the English courts which prompted 
the language above quoted to be included in the 
Amendment. 
*842. The Amendment does not say, and it never 
was meant to say that a criminal must have counsel. 
All it ever said was that he had a right to have 
counsel to assist him. 
In this case the defendant was never denied any 
right to have counsel and so I would affirm the trial 
court in what was done. However, I can see no 
harm in permitting a new sentence to be imposed 
upon the defendant. 
FN1. See In re Haro, 71 Cal.2d 1021, 80 Cal.Rptr. 
588, 594, 458 P.2d 500, 506 (1969), wherein the 
court stated: '. . . we cannot condone in the 
present case the failure of the trial court to 
reinform defendant of his right to counsel when he 
appeared for the first time without his counsel for 
sentencing, nor can we countenance the trial 
court's failure to require defendant's waiver of his 
right to counsel in open court before the rendition 
of sentence.' 
FN2. 51 Cal.2d 699, 336 P.2d 164, 165 (1959). 
FN3. Also see People v. Horton, 174 Cal.App.2d 
740, 345 P.2d 45, 47(1959). 
FN4. 99 Ariz. 269, 408 P.2d 408, 409 (1965). 
FN5. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 205, 310 P.2d 
388, 393 (1957). 
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FN6. See Martin v. United States (C.A. 5th 1950), 
182 F.2d 225, 22 A.L.R.2d 1236, 1239-1240. 
FN7. Note 4, supra. 
FN8. 393 U.S. 2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2, 4 
(1968). 
FN9. State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 72, 7 P.2d 
825, 826 (1932); also see Ex Parte Folck, Folck v. 
Watson, 102 Utah 470, 473, 132 P.2d 130 (1942). 
FN1. See my lonesome opinion in Dyett v. Turner, 
20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968). 
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